African Union Mission In Somalia Research Articles

African Union Mission in Somalia Considerations for Transition and Kenya’s National Security

This study assessed the implications of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on Kenya's national security within the context of AMISOM's transition to the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). The objective of the study was analyse achievement of African Union Mission in Somalia mandates, to examine the effects to Kenya's National security and assess transition strategies of national security. The study was guided by Functionalist, Strategic and Securitisation theories. The research employed a mixed-methods research design using questionnaire surveys and interviews with respondents in Kenya's border counties most affected by Somali instability. Study findings established that, while a majority (52%) believe AMISOM has achieved its mandate to a moderate extent, concerns remain regarding the capacity of Somali Security Forces (SSF) and the overall stability of Somalia. In addition, study findings established that while progress has been made in degrading Al-Shabaab and supporting the Somali Federal Government (FGS). However, only a third of respondents believe the SSF has been adequately mentored by AMISOM. Despite success in facilitating humanitarian assistance and Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) projects, nearly two-thirds believe Somalia lacks the conditions necessary for long-term stability. The study concludes that AMISOM's transition strategy inadequately addresses governance and security aspects essential for Kenyan security. Weak SSF and FGS capacity pose a threat of failed stabilization after AMISOM's withdrawal. Additionally, Kenya's current border security measures are insufficient to manage potential spill over effects. ANOVA indicated an F statistic of 134.318 and a p value of 0.000<0.05 thus the Somalia PSO strategies significantly predict Kenya’s National Security. Regressions weight model (β = -0.451, P = .000<.05) implied that Nature of Somalia PSO strategies negatively influences Kenya’s National Security. The study recommends a revision of the AMISOM transition strategy to include capacity building for FGS and SSF, including forces in federal member states like Jubaland; allocation of sufficient time for a well-monitored transition with clear benchmarks; an exploration cautious negotiations with Al-Shabaab, contingent on a strong FGS and a hybrid AU-UN peacekeeping mission to succeed ATMIS to ensure Kenya's long-term security.

Differential methylation of linoleic acid pathway genes is associated with PTSD symptoms – a longitudinal study with Burundian soldiers returning from a war zone

Soldiers may be exposed to traumatic stress during combat deployment and thus are at risk for developing posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Genetic and epigenetic evidence suggests that PTSD is linked to forming stress-related memories. In the current study, we investigated post-deployment associations of PTSD symptoms with differential DNA methylation in a sample of Burundian soldiers returning from the African Union Mission in Somalia’s war zone. We used a matched longitudinal study design to explore epigenetic changes associated with PTSD symptoms in N = 191 participants. PTSD symptoms and saliva samples were collected at 1–3 (t1) and 9–14 months (t2) after the return of the soldiers to their home base. Individuals with either worsening or improving PTSD symptoms were matched for age, stressful, traumatic and self-perpetrated events prior to the post-assessment, traumatic and violent experiences between the post- and the follow-up assessment, and violence experienced during childhood. A mixed model analysis was conducted to identify top nominally significantly differentially methylated genes, which were then used to perform a gene enrichment analysis. The linoleic acid metabolism pathway was significantly associated with post-deployment PTSD symptoms, after accounting for multiple comparisons. Linoleic acid has been linked to memory and immune related processes in previous research. Our findings suggest that differential methylation of linoleic acid pathway genes is associated with PTSD and thus may merit closer inspection as a possible mediator of resilience.

Countering Terrorism through Peace Support Operations, Lessons from the African Union Mission in Somalia

Abstract The African Union (au) has responded to the political and security crisis in Somalia by deploying the au Mission in Somalia (amisom) in 2007. The amisom was au’s largest and the most complex peace support operation and one of its strategic objectives became degrading Al-Shabaab and reducing the threat posed by terrorist groups. While amisom has contributed to reducing the territorial spread of the group, over the past 16 years, it has at a heavy cost of counterterrorism operations deployed in extremely risky conditions, resulting in high cost of human life. Drawing on some of the lessons of amisom, this paper examines the effectiveness and sustainability of African-led Peace Support Operations in countering terrorism. The paper illustrates some of the shortfalls of military heavy response and makes the case for a conceptual framework (comprehensive approach), for dealing with the threat of terrorism in Somalia driven by a number of underlying political, economic and social factors. Finally, the paper reflects on how amisom has shaped continental policies and responses to insecurity.

The Role of The European Union (EU) in Promoting Regional Integration, Sustainable Development and Conflict Resolution in Somalia

This study focuses on the role of the European Union in promoting regional integration, sustainable development and conflict resolution in Somalia. The main objectives of the study were  to assess the role of European Union in in promoting regional integration, sustainable development, and conflict resolution in Somalia, the challenges hindering the role of European Union in promoting regional integration, sustainable development, and conflict resolution in Somalia. The study employed qualitative research approach to gain sound and empirical understanding on the role of the European Union in promoting regional integration, sustainable development and conflict resolution in Somalia. The researcher used an extensive documentary review tool to gather existing knowledge and insights on the role of the European Union in promoting regional integration, sustainable development and conflict resolution in Somalia. The findings of the study on the role of the EU in promoting regional integration in Somalia includes:  Supporting the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), promoting political dialogue and reconciliation, enhancing economic development and trade, providing humanitarian aid and development assistance; the role of the EU in promoting sustainable development entails: Supporting agriculture and food security, enhancing access to clean water and sanitation, promoting renewable energy and climate change resilience, strengthening governance and institutions; the role of EU in conflict resolution in Somalia includes: supporting political dialogue and reconciliation, providing humanitarian aid and development assistance, and supporting regional peacekeeping efforts; the challenges hindering the role of EU in promoting regional integration, sustainable development, and conflict resolution in Somalia include: political instability, weak governance structure, limited resources and funding and cultural and ethnic fragmentation. The study recommends that to enhance the role of the European Union (EU) in promoting regional integration, sustainable development, and conflict resolution in Somalia there should be strengthening political engagement, increasing financial Support, focusing on security sector reform, promotion of economic development and job creation and strengthening regional cooperation.

The Role of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in Political Instability in Somalia, Case Study: Mogadishu Somalia

The Role of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in Political Instability in Somalia, Case Study: Mogadishu Somalia

Generation three and a half peacekeeping: Understanding the evolutionary character of African-led Peace Support Operations

ABSTRACT African-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) were established to support the African peace and security architecture by developing integrated capacities for deployment in crises. However, since the deployment of the first African-led PSOs, there has also been the emergence of new types of African-led PSOs, such as the African Union Mission in Somalia; the Lake Chad Basin Commission Multinational Joint Task Force; the Joint Force for the Group of Five for the Sahel; the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique; and the East African Community Force in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. The paper examines why African-led PSOs have emerged, arguing that these operations have allowed for increased African agency and shaped the African peace and security space. The paper finds that African-led PSO reflects a more regional and local-specific response in a declining era of new United Nations peacekeeping operations but has also resulted in an overreliance on force to solve the continent’s peace and security issues. Consequently, the paper arrives at a novel conceptualisation of African-led PSOs, positing that they represent generation three and a half of peacekeeping which focus on the effectiveness of force and the morality of using force to deal with insecurity and multifaceted crisis.

Somalia and the Islamist War: Assessing the Probability of Al-Shabab Winning or Losing the War with Somalia

In this article, we assess the ongoing conflict between al-Shabaab on the one hand, and the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Union Mission in Somalia(AMISOM), on the other. Though al-Shabab has been around since the mid 2000s, the current round of the conflict began in 2010 when AMISOM was deployed to Somalia to bolster the fledgling Somali government. The main thrust of the paper, therefore, is to reexamine what effect, if any, this African force has had on the conflict. Data were collected from 2009-2021 through monitoring and analysis was done using software. Data gathered included recording specific instances of violence between the two groups, including who orchestrated the violence, the location of the violence and the fatalities in each act of violence. While TFG/AMISOM made substantial gains initially against al-Shabab, the result did not specifically conclude which of the two groups is poised to win the war. However, it demonstrates that al-Shabab is able to stay in play by resorting to a host of other strategies which neither the TFG nor AMISOM can deploy.

Understanding African Agency in Peace and Security: Tanzania’s Implementation of “Non-Indifference” in Somalia

Against the backdrop of the plurality of agents and contexts, Africa’s peace and security norms have remained contested and open to interpretation in political practice. This article argues that African agents manifest their agencies precisely through their distinct interpretation and implementation of security norms. Based on Tanzania’s rejection to join the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007, this article zooms into the underlying domestic complexities by focusing in particular on the crucial influence of national identities for the ongoing construction of normative meaning in Africa’s peace and security landscape.

‘The Home Stress’: The Role of Soldiers’ Family Life on Peacekeeping Missions, the Case of Sierra Leone

ABSTRACT Through the case of the Sierra Leonean deployment on the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), this study argues that family-related stress is an often-overlooked challenge in peacekeeping deployments. Using in-depth interviews with Sierra Leonean soldiers who were part of the deployment, military decision makers, and foreign advisors, this article lays out specific factors that created family-related tensions and contributed to lowered morale for Sierra Leonean peacekeepers. It demonstrates that the family-related stress on deployment is not only an issue of family separation, it is entangled with the historic trajectories of the armed forces and the sending country’s socio-economic conditions. The focus on Sierra Leone highlights the additional and unique burdens that soldiers and their families may endure in troop contributions from lower-income countries.

Rebuilding armies in southern Somalia: What currently should donors realistically aim for?

ABSTRACT Improving defence accountability and effectiveness is even more difficult when wars are actively underway. Southern Somalia bears considerable resemblance to previous counterinsurgency theatres in Afghanistan and Iraq, and thus considerations of defence assistance should be actively informed by those campaigns. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) intervention force has been critical to seizing much of the towns and terrain now freed from the Islamist Al-Shabaab insurgents. But after 13 years AMISOM’s power is waning. There are vanishingly few instant and game-changing initiatives donors could take quickly to aid the build-up of Somali military forces either at the federal or regional levels. Yet decentralised Federal Member State governments represent important political forces in southern Somalia, and since 2012 efforts have been made to reinforce them. Perhaps the most immediate action that donors could take to aid the build-up of legitimate Somali military forces is to supply and work with, not just the Federal Government’s forces as has long been the case, but also the various military forces maintained by the Federal Member States.

Evaluating the Challenges and Opportunities of the Use of Military Diplomacy in Intrastate Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa

Military diplomacy is increasingly relied on in the management of intra state conflicts globally. Far more common and controversial is the issue of combat troops to help end fighting in an intractable conflict. The Horn of Africa is an epitome of intractable regional intrastate conflicts   that have attracted international, regional and even individual state military and humanitarian intervention since the 1970s. The Somalia and Sudan crises provide typical examples in which such efforts have been witnessed yet they also provide a case study of successful military diplomacy by African states in states engaged in protracted intra-state conflicts. This study was conceived to evaluate the challenges and opportunities of the use of military diplomacy in intrastate conflict management in the Horn of Africa. The study was located in the rational logic theory. It was carried out among peace groups and individuals who had participated in peace processes in the Horn of Africa. These were located in Mogadishu and Kismayu, Khartoum and Juba and embassies in Kenya that represent the Horn of Africa countries. Security personnel who have had a role in the Horn of Africa peace processes at African Union (AU), Inter - Governmental Authority on Development  (IGAD), East Africa Standby Force (EASF), United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), United Nations Africa (Union) Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and African (Union) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) were key informants. The study used purposive sampling and snowballing to determine the sample size. Data was collected using interview schedules and questionnaires which were analyzed using Concurrent Nested (Embedded) Design. Secondary data were gathered and reviewed from Journals, books and published proceedings that corroborated the primary data. The findings indicate that the obscurity of the military and the rubric in the understanding of military diplomacy poses a challenge for the military to influence intrastate conflicts in the Horn of Africa. This is compounded by other challenges including the Cold War mentality that has made the region to witness a series of foreign activities leading to militarization of the Horn of Africa with establishment of military bases in the Horn of Africa. Peace support operations are expensive to manage yet the missions undertaken in the Horn of Africa lack sustainable source of funds and instead over rely on foreign funding and goodwill. With no sufficient funds, buying equipment and paying the staff becomes a big challenge. Emerging threats and clan dynamics are actualities that the use of military diplomacy was found to face as a challenge. To change these challenges into opportunities requires rational logic from all stakeholders in the conflict management process

The African Union and Peacekeeping in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities

Africa continues to suffer from outbreaks of conflict, with evidence pointing to an increasing number of violent armed incidents. The establishment of the African Union (AU) heralded (or so it was hoped) a new era in how African conflicts are managed and resolved. Since 2003, the AU has mandated a number of peace support operations including the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), as a means to manage conflicts on the continent. In more recent times, the organization has also authorized three operations dealing with non-state armed groups namely the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Boko Haram and the Sahel Region Jihadists. Whilst some of these peace support missions recorded successes in meeting their mandates, generally all of them faced or are facing a number of challenges including funding, and logistical inadequacies among others. At the same time, the AU’s engagement in peacekeeping in Africa has occasioned opportunities for the organization including: increasing its capacity building in the area of conflict prevention, management and resolution; adoption of initiatives like “Silencing the Guns” aimed at lessening the outbreak of conflicts; and establishing its own funding mechanisms on how to support its mandated and authorized peace support missions among others.

Counter-Insurgency Operations of the African Union and Mitigation of Humanitarian Crisis in Somalia

AbstractThe protracted armed conflict in Somalia has engendered an unprecedented humanitarian crisis; one that makes it a leading storehouse of the worst humanitarian conditions in the world. The intervention of the African Union (AU) through its third Peace Support Operation- the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)- was aimed at supporting the Transitional Federal Institutions in the stabilisation of the country, advancing dialogue and reconciliation as well as facilitating the provision of humanitarian support. The achievement of the humanitarian component of the mission’s mandate is largely contingent on the first two mandates. Essentially, this study interrogated the interface between the implementation of the humanitarian component of AMISOM mandate and the control of the worsening conditions of Somali internally displaced persons and refugees. Anchoring analysis within the classical approach to national security, the study found that the restoration of relative stability in the polity has not widened access to economic and humanitarian assistance in the terror-laden state of Somalia. Thus, greater commitment of major stakeholders, especially the United Nations (UN), the United States as well as the AU is required in the transmutation of AMISOM and Somalia National Armed Forces into a force that is entirely indigenous to the people of Somalia. This will serve as an elixir to the ever-constricting humanitarian corridor that has exacerbated the conditions of the victims of forced migration in Somalia.

Strategic Communications for Peace Operations: The African Union’s Information War Against al-Shabaab

Despite widespread agreement that effective strategic communications are a necessary part of complex peace operations, many missions struggle to generate relevant capabilities and implement effective campaigns. This article analyzes the experiences of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) as a case study of this problem. Specifically, it examines how the United Nations (UN) tried to fill the gap by hiring a consortium of private firms known as the AU-UN Information Support Team (IST) to wage a strategic communications campaign against al-Shabaab. The IST’s goal was to drive, as well as communicate, AMISOM’s success, improve the mission’s media presence, and develop a communications strategy. The IST played an innovative and important function for AMISOM but suffered from several significant challenges that reduced its effectiveness. The conclusion therefore identifies four main lessons from AMISOM’s experiences that could improve strategic communications for peace operations.

Joining AMISOM: why six African states contributed troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia

ABSTRACTDeployed to Mogadishu, Somalia in March 2007, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) became the Union’s longest running, largest, most costly, and most deadly operation. Yet, of the 54 AU members, only 6 contributed troops to AMISOM: Uganda (2007), Burundi (2007), Djibouti (2011), Kenya (2012), Sierra Leone (2013) and Ethiopia (2014). This article applies a widely utilized theoretical framework to explain peacekeeping contributions in order to analyse why these six states chose to join AMISOM. It concludes that there is no single or uniform explanation for their decision. Nevertheless, the most common official justifications – assertions that events in Somalia posed a direct security risk to the troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and normative commitments to African solidarity – were often less important than other unacknowledged or downplayed factors. Specifically, a combination of institutional, political, and economic factors was generally more important in understanding why these six states became AMISOM TCCs. Joining AMISOM did help alleviate some regional security concerns but the decision also brought tangible benefits at home to both the TCC governments and their militaries.

UN Support to Regional Peace Operations: Lessons from UNSOA

Authorized in January 2009, the UN Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA) was an unprecedented operation. Through UNSOA, the Department of Field Support used the UN’s assessed contributions to directly support a non-UN regional peace operation (AMISOM). Although this significantly enhanced AMISOM’s capabilities and increased its overall effectiveness, UNSOA faced numerous challenges that severely inhibited its ability to deliver on all its mandated tasks. This report analyzes five sets of challenges that UNSOA faced from 2009 through to 2015. These challenges revolved around the expanding scope of UNSOA’s tasks, the clash between the UN and the AU’s organizational cultures, the highly insecure operating environment, the size of the theater of operations, and some of AMISOM’s idiosyncrasies. On the basis of these challenges, the report offers several lessons for future UN support for regional peace operations: - It is unwise to separate control over logistics from control over operations. - The UN’s current bureaucratic rules and procedures are not quick or flexible enough to support forces dispersed over large distances in conducting sustained maneuver warfare. - Regional organizations must put in place mechanisms to ensure accountability and transparency when using the UN’s assessed peacekeeping contributions. - All stakeholders must share information better. - The UN should explore how best its field missions can support the development of host-state national security forces. - UN and AU field operations and planning processes need to be better linked.

Somalia’s ever-arduous transition

The 8 February 2017 presidential election in Somalia afforded Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (also known as Farmajo) an exceptionally strong mandate to fight corruption and governmental dysfunction, and to forge elusive state viability. But it is essential for him to ensure that Somali national forces are capable of maintaining Somalia’s security against the still-formidable jihadist group al-Shabaab before the UN-mandated African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) departs.

Al-Shabaab, Social Identity Group, Human (In)Security, and Counterterrorism

ABSTRACTThis article examines the link between human security, social identity, and al-Shabaab. The first section explores how social identity group theory can help explain al-Shabaab's recruitment. The second part focuses on the counterterrorism campaign against al-Shabaab, which involves decapitation, aggressive peacekeeping through a proxy in the shape of the African Union Mission in Somalia, and the role of a domestic de-radicalization program. The article concludes that al-Shabaab's allure is in decline and the group is facing internal turmoil, which makes its overtures toward the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant very dangerous, as al-Shabaab could act as an effective conduit between the Arabian Peninsula and Africa.

Contact Dilemma: The Malady of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Troops

The collapse of Somali Government in the early 1990s left the state in the hands of predatory war lords who wrecked the country into havoc. The country has remained in a state of violent conflict for nearly over two decades. Intervention of United Nations Operations in Somalia failed to meet its objectives leaving the vulnerable population at the mercy of warlords when it finally withdrew its troops from the war torn nation. Despite the efforts of AMISOM troops to degrade the capability of Al Shabaab, little has been achieved. The militant group seems to be attacking the troops with vigour and renewed strength. With new barbaric counterinsurgency tactics, the terror group is regaining holds in the previously liberated regions. The soldiers tend to flee when they get engagements with Al Shabaab. They are unable to hold and suppress the firepower during contact. Consequently, the soldiers go into a flight mode turning their defensive position into a rout. This act is proving to be catastrophic to the mission since it occasions fatalities to the troops. Some who miss in action get lost into the hostile enemy territory. It is in this context that the study reports ways in which this malady can be curbed through the lens of contact dilemma.

Al-Shabaab, Social Identity Group, Human (In)Security & U.S. Counterterrorism

This paper examines the link between human security, social identity and al-Shabaab and U.S. counterterrorism towards the Somali-based group. The aim is to show how al-Shabaab feeds on the anger of marginalized individuals which is then infused with al-Shabaab interpretation of Islam as a way to recruit disgruntled individuals. Nevertheless, it appears that Al-Shabaab’s allure is in decline, leading to the author to look at the U.S. counterterrorism campaign against al-Shabaab, which involves decapitation, aggressive peacekeeping through a proxy in the shape of the African Union Mission in Somalia, and domestic de-radicalisation program.